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The Refugee Crisis

Professor Christian Dustmann comments on the current European debate on the refugee crisis and migration quotas on BBC World Service 

 

Immigrant and disadvantaged children benefit most from early childcare

Attending universal childcare from age three significantly improves the school readiness of children from immigrant and disadvantaged family backgrounds.

Press Release

Discussion Paper

iNews

UCL News

FAZ

VoxEU

 

The Criminal Behaviour of Young Fathers

CReAM Research by Christian Dustmann and  Rasmus Landersø, finds that  very young fathers who have their first child while they are still teenagers subsequently commit less crime if the child is a boy than if it is a girl. This  then has a spill over effect on other young men of a similar age living in the same neighbourhoods as the young father. The research was covered on the British press.

Press Release

Discussion Paper

VoxEU

The Telegraph

The Times

 

BBC 2

"I was quite prepared... to use the cover of the statistician's analysis": Former home secretary David Blunkett and Prof Dustmann on the 2003 report on EU accession

 

British Academy

Professor Christian Dustmann has been elected Fellow of the British Academy in recognition for his academic career and public engagement.

 

Handelsblatt

Professor Christian Dustmann ranked within the top 3 German speaking economists on the 2017 Handelsblatt ranking.

 

Brexit

BBC News

Professor Christian Dustmann discussing recent trends in foreign-born worker flows in and out of the UK on the BBC News at One.

 

CReAM seminar

CReAM - Seminar in Applied Economics Series
Benjamin Friedrich (Kellogg School of Management)

“Internal Labor Markets and the Competition for Managerial Talent”

Event date: Monday 4th March 2019
Time: 4:00-5:30 Place: TBC Speaker Room: 224

This paper studies how firms use internal promotions and external hiring to recruit managers. Using matched employer-employee data from Denmark, I document that more productive firms hire more talented trainees, are more likely to promote managers internally, and match with better managers in terms of education and ability. Based on these facts, I develop an assignment model of the market for managers with two-sided heterogeneity. In the model internal labor markets arise from asymmetric learning and firm-specific human capital. Production complementarities between firm productivity and manager talent result in better firms investing in promising workers and in developing talent through firm-specific training and internal promotion. I estimate the model using Danish data. Model simulations indicate that reducing information frictions increases aggregate productivity but leads to higher wage inequality because better signals of talent increase competition for the best managers. This mechanism provides a new market-driven explanation for the increase in upper-tail wage inequality.